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REJECTING CUSTOMARY REGRESSION:
UNILATERAL HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION & THE EVOLUTION OF
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Elisabeth J. Brennen*

I. Introduction
Humanitarian intervention is perhaps one of the most important topics
in international affairs. It raises questions of morality and militarism,
becoming a platform for sharp debate in international law. This note
discusses both the moral and legal questions presented by unilateral
humanitarian intervention (“UHI”). It argues that UHI is antithetical to the
progression of customary international law due to customary international
law’s evolutive nature and the ongoing importance of decolonization. UHI
is not only normatively undesirable, but the particular normative criticisms
of the doctrine – that it is regressively imperialist and neo-colonial – render
it fundamentally incompatible with customary international law.
“Humanitarian intervention” generally refers to the use of force across
state borders in pursuit of protecting civilian lives, without the consent of
1
the targeted state. It is important to distinguish between “collective” and
“unilateral” interventions. “Collective” refers not to the number of states
participating in each intervention, but rather to the presence of a mandate or
2
authorization from the United Nations (“U.N.”) Security Council.
Conversely, “unilateral” humanitarian intervention refers not to a state
acting alone, but rather to a state or group of states acting without Security
3
Council authorization.

*
J.D., University of Michigan Law School (2021). I’m grateful to Professor Monica
Hakimi for inspiring and encouraging this note. Thanks also to Professor Patrick Barry and his
team, MJIL’s editors, Liam Beers, Vineet Chandra, and Ali Habhab for their feedback on this
piece.
1.
It can also refer to the threat of the use of force or the use of economic, diplomatic,
and other sanctions, as well as rescuing the intervening state’s own citizens. These kinds of
interventions are outside of the scope of this note, which focuses exclusively on cross-border
uses of force as a means of addressing humanitarian crises, such as mass atrocities.
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 18 (J. L.
Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane eds., 2003); Šárka Moravcová, The Controversy over
Humanitarian Intervention and Responsibility to Protect, 22 PERSPS. 65, 65 (2014).
2.
Anders Henriksen & Marc Schack, The Crisis in Syria and Humanitarian
Intervention, 1 J. ON USE FORCE & INT’L L. 122, 123 (2014).
3.
See id. at 123; Daphne Richemond, Normativity in International Case of
Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention, 6 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 45, 47 (2003).
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There is no real debate on the legality of collective humanitarian
interventions; with Security Council authorization, such an intervention falls
squarely within the U.N. Charter’s exceptions to the general prohibition on
4
the use of force. However, scholars, practitioners, and governments remain
split on the legality of unilateral humanitarian interventions. Some frame
UHI as a legally permitted action, while others critique it as a Charter
5
violation not yet grounded in customary international law. There is also
heated debate about UHI’s practical and normative desirability, ranging
from those who frame UHI as a positive moral obligation to those who
critique it as counterproductive and colonial in nature.
Part II of this note frames UHI as a continuation of colonial impulses,
mirroring the civilizing missions and colonial impositions of the past. This
Part engages with Third World Approaches to International Law
(“TWAIL”) to draw parallels between past colonial practice and
contemporary unilateral humanitarian interventions.
Part III discusses the current legal status of unilateral humanitarian
intervention. It concludes that the right to unilateral humanitarian
intervention has not yet been established in international law. However,
each new UHI reinvigorates the legal debate, particularly with respect to its
status under customary international law. As the practice of UHI develops,
it is important to continually position it within the legal framework of
customary international law. It is also important to consider whether the
practice is compatible with customary international law.
Finally, Part IV takes up the question of UHI’s status under customary
international law and considers its compatibility with one of the central
purposes of customary international law itself: moving the law forward.
This Part argues that such an evolutive purpose is incompatible with
practices that advance neo-colonialism. As customary international law is
evolutive in nature, this note argues that it should not allow for neo-colonial
regression but must instead continue the decolonial project. The note
ultimately concludes that state practice of UHI should not be understood as

4.
See U.N. Charter art. 2(4), 51.
5.
See, e.g., Kevin Jon Heller, Why Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention is Illegal
and Potentially Criminal, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 17, 2020), http://opiniojuris.org/2017/04/
20/against-unilateral-humanitarian-intervention-and-why-it-can-be-criminal/; Jennifer Trahan,
In Defense of Humanitarian Intervention, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 19, 2017), https://
opiniojuris.org/2017/04/19/in-defense-of-humanitarian-intervention/; Harold Honju Koh, Not
Illegal: But Now The Hard Part Begins, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 7, 2017), https://
www.justsecurity.org/39695/illegal-hard-part-begins/; Jens David Ohlin, Two Visions of the
UN Charter, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 13, 2017), https://opiniojuris.org/2017/04/13/two-visions-ofthe-un-charter/ (all responding to the 2017 U.S. airstrikes against Syria and to each other’s
posts); see also Steve G. Simon, The Contemporary Legality of Unilateral Humanitarian
Intervention, 24 CAL. WESTERN INT’L L.J. 117 (1993); Petr Valek, Is Unilateral
Humanitarian Intervention Compatible with the U.N. Charter?, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1223
(2005).
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contributing to state practice in a way that develops customary international
law but should instead be rejected as incompatible with it.

II. Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention
as Customary Regression
Unilateral humanitarian intervention is often framed as a new and
6
developing space in the law. On the one hand, proponents of UHI embrace
this development as a method of providing “immediate and urgent relief” in
7
humanitarian crises. They often view unilateral action as necessary when
the Security Council does not consider or does not approve collective
8
intervention in humanitarian crises. On the other hand, critics of UHI are
skeptical of its legal development, viewing it as a continuation of colonial
9
interventionist policy and as doing more harm than good.
Some of the strongest critiques of UHI come from Third World
Approaches to International Law (“TWAIL”) scholarship. These theorists
frame unilateral humanitarian intervention as part of imperialism’s “state of
becoming,” a process of regenerating and rebranding itself to maintain
10
global power imbalances.
Thus, to TWAIL scholars, unilateral
humanitarian intervention is not a new practice. Rather, it builds on colonial
interventionist history, couching old practices in the new rhetoric of
11
humanitarianism.
TWAIL theorists and post-colonial states are right to be skeptical of
unilateral humanitarian intervention and its proponents. In many ways, the
rhetoric and practice of unilateral humanitarian intervention mirrors the
12
“civilizing missions” of the past in worrying ways.
In the nineteenth century, one of the key ideological touchpoints of
civilizing missions was the “simplification of diverse peoples and historical
13
experiences into conceptual boxes.” This same over-simplification is
reflected in interventionist discourse today when interventionist
policymakers and commentators similarly place humanitarian crises into

See, e.g., Koh, supra note 5.
Trahan, supra note 5.
Id.
See, e.g., FIDELE INGIYIMBERE, DOMESTICATING HUMAN RIGHTS: A
REAPPRAISAL OF THEIR CULTURAL-POLITICAL CRITIQUES AND THEIR IMPERIALISTIC USE
57–114 (Rasmussen & Ferrara eds., 2017) (tracing humanitarian intervention theory and
practice from the imperial era to the modern day).
10.
See ANN LAURA STOLER & CAROLE MCGRANAHAN, IMPERIAL FORMATIONS 8
(Ann Laura Stoler & Peter C. Perdue eds., 2007).
11.
See, e.g., INGIYIMBERE, supra note 9, at 57–114
12.
Id. at 50–53 (discussing the evolution of human rights theory from one of the
historical justifications for imperialism to modern civilizing rhetoric).
13.
Harry Liebersohn, Introduction: The Civilizing Mission, 27 J. WORLD HISTORY
383, 383 (2016).
6.
7.
8.
9.
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“conceptual boxes.” Individual context is not always considered when
determining the legal status of unilateral humanitarian intervention. Rather,
the actions and reactions of states considering intervention are
overemphasized in the debate, while the vehement opposition from a
14
diverse coalition of states tends to be disregarded.
The interventionist often cares less about the factual differences at the
heart of a conflict than they do about the universal principles being violated
15
across conflicts. But factual differences matter in the law. When
considering a step as drastic as unilateral intervention, the varied
circumstances in which conflicts and crises arise are relevant. For instance,
Kosovo, Rwanda, Libya, and Syria are some of the paradigmatic examples
16
of unilateral humanitarian intervention’s success or failure. They are
discussed as precedent and anti-precedent for each other and for other
interventions, yet their conflicts have very little in common other than
17
Western handwringing over the prospect of intervention. Rather than

14.
See, e.g., Trahan, supra note 5 (centering the Kosovo intervention in discussing the
legality of the Syrian intervention; dismissing opposition to the practice due to the continued
invocation of unilateral humanitarian intervention).
15.
See, e.g., NICHOLAS J. WHEELER, UNILATERAL HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 210 (summarizing the UK’s legal arguments regarding NATO’s
1998 unilateral humanitarian intervention in the FRY, invoking the precedent of the 1992
intervention in northern Iraq. The arguments centered on the “humanitarian necessity,”
arguing that “force may be used in extreme circumstances to avert a humanitarian
catastrophe.” The intervention in Iraq was understood as a form of precedent because of
humanitarian need and former intervention; no arguments as to the similarities or differences
between the Iraqi and FRY conflicts was presented publicly); Moravcová, supra note 1, at 65
(“The on-going civil war in Syria, the escalating armed conflicts in Iraq and the Gaza Strip,
the extensive use of force by the security forces in Sudan, and the systematic attacks on
civilians in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo and other places
reflect the continuous presence of large-scale violence in contemporary world affairs.
Although the particular circumstances of these crisis situations are very different, they raise
the very same fundamental question . . . whether to intervene forcefully in cases of a serious
intra-state crisis, and if so, under what conditions.”).
16.
See, e.g., Alan J. Kuperman, A Model Humanitarian Intervention?, INT’L SEC.,
Summer 2013, at 105, 105 (discussing the success of the intervention in Libya in light of the
history of intervention in Kosovo, Rwanda and then-potential intervention in Syria, among
other past interventions); Walden Bello, The Crisis of Humanitarian Intervention, RELIEF
WEB (AUG. 9. 2011) https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_
2215.pdf (discussing the interventions in Syria and Libya in a historical context, referencing
the Kosovo and Rwanda situations as catalysts in the UHI debate); Rosa Brooks, Lessons for
International Law from the Arab Spring, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 713–32 (2013) (discussing
the legality of UHI and Responsibility to Protect in light of the Kosovo, Rwanda, Syria, and
Libya cases).
17.
See, e.g., Syrian Civil War, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/
event/Syrian-Civil-War (last visited Oct. 5, 2021) (identifying the catalysts of the Syrian Civil
War as including anti-authoritarianism, anti-corruption sentiment, economic frustrations over
capitalist-cronyism, and environmental crisis); Jeremy Maron, What Led to the Genocide
against the Tutsi in Rwanda?, CAN. MUSEUM HUM. RTS., https://humanrights.ca/story/whatled-to-the-genocide-against-the-tutsi-in-rwanda (last visited Oct. 5, 2021) (identifying the
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investigating the unique contexts of each humanitarian crisis,
18
interventionists conceptually anchor the conflicts to intervention alone.
As a result of the interventionists’ tendency to gloss over the specifics
of each conflict, existing scholarship does not recognize that the factual
nuances of a humanitarian crisis could be relevant to a UHI’s legality. There
is a missed opportunity for robust debate about whether the individual facts
of crises might be relevant to potential unilateral humanitarian intervention.
That Rwanda’s ethnic genocide might be distinguishable from Libya’s
political civil war in the context of justifying UHI has not been adequately
19
discussed. Instead, the diverse conflicts, states, and populations targeted
for unilateral humanitarian intervention are pushed into the same conceptual
boxes. They are framed as passive recipients of intervention, and their
varied political and social realities are ignored. The debate centers outside
intervenors’ understanding of what is morally and legally relevant, without
20
due regard for local nuance.
Unilateral humanitarian intervention further mirrors the colonial
civilizing mission’s narrative by simplifying complex conflicts into familiar
narratives and “establish[ing] Western powers as legitimate monitors of
21
how [conflicts] should unfold . . .”
Contrasted with the above
simplification process, which groups distinct conflicts together into an
“intervention” category, this process oversimplifies each individual conflict
into a digestible narrative of democracy, human rights, and/or related
22
universal norms. Thus, the process frames Western intervenors, as the
principal architects of these international legal norms, as inherently
understanding of the broad goals and potential outcomes of humanitarian
23
crises.
This exacerbates the problematic nature of the former
simplification: as the West already knows what target states want in
conflict, there is no need to concern themselves with the factual situation.
Rather than learning the unique contours of each international conflict, the
modern civilizing narrative invokes the universality of humanitarian ideals
to claim that intervenors know the desires and motivations of people on the

catalysts of the Rwandan civil war & genocide as post-colonial inter-ethnic tension and
political turmoil).
18.
See, e.g., Samantha Power, Stopping Genocide and Securing “Justice”: Learning
by Doing, 69 SOC. RSCH. 1093 (2002).
19.
See WHEELER, supra note 15; Moravcová, supra note 1.
20.
See Mojtaba Mahdavi, A Postcolonial Critique of Responsibility to Protect in the
Middle East, 20 PERCEPTIONS 7, 23 (2014).
21.
Stefan Borg, The Arab Uprisings, the Liberal Civilizing Narrative and the Problem
of Orientalism, 25 MIDDLE E. CRITIQUE 211, 212 (2014).
22.
Id. at 212 (“Human rights in this narrative play a crucial role since their
universality guarantees that the West knows what the Arab world wants.”).
23.
Id.
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ground. This narrative positions the West as the arbiter of and authority on
25
those “universal” values – claiming to have experience implementing the
relevant norms in ways that target states do not. The intervening states are
thus understood as being in a “privileged position to assist and monitor” the
26
attainment of these ideals.
The intervenors’ vision of themselves as the authority on universalist
goals and of their “ethical obligation” to “guide” conflicts also relates to the
27
idea of colonial responsibility. In the colonial era, “Western states
28
assumed the moral responsibility for others to progress.” Here, the new
civilizing narrative of UHI matches the colonial line of thought: developed,
typically Western states, have both the moral authority and moral obligation
29
to help target states progress. The emphasis on universality thus overrides
30
the competing political demands in crisis. Again, interventionist framing
ignores local nuance, even though this context is crucial to understanding
any crisis’ potential outcomes.
Postcolonial critiques of UHI challenge the vision of universality,
objectivity, and neutrality that UHI purports to actualize. These critiques
suggest that “liberal and neoliberal institutionalist discourses often appear as
31
rationalization of hegemony disguised as universal humanism.” Former
UN Assistant Secretary-General Ramesh Thakur, himself one of the
32
principal architects of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, writes:
“They” (the European colonizers) came to liberate “us” (the
colonized natives) from our local tyrants and stayed to rule as
benevolent despots . . . Should they be surprised that their fine talk

24.
Id. (discussing the liberal civilizing narrative of universal rights in the context of
the Arab Spring, based on analysis of the collected speeches of President Barack Obama,
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and two major EU statements on the Arab uprisings).
25.
The actual universality of these values, their desirability, and the extent to which
they are accepted versus imposed on non-Western states are topics taken up elsewhere in
Third World Approaches to International Law (“TWAIL”) scholarship. See, e.g. Borg, supra
note 21, at 212–13.
26.
Id. at 219.
27.
Id. at 221.
28.
Id.
29.
See B.S. Chimni, Capitalism, Imperialism, and International Law in the TwentyFirst Century, 14 OR. REV. INT’L L. 17, 31–32 (2012) (citing INGIYIMBERE, supra note 9, at
50–53.).
30.
Borg, supra note 21, at 221.
31.
Mahdavi, supra note 20, at 8–9
32.
See Ramesh Thakur, AUSTL. NAT’L U. https://crawford.anu.edu.au/people/
visitors/ramesh-thakur, (last visited Oct. 3, 2021).
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of humanitarian intervention translates in our consciousness into
33
efforts to resurrect and perpetuate rule by foreigners?
Discourse surrounding UHI in the Middle East and North Africa in
particular echoes Orientalist and colonialist views largely rejected by the
34
international community. Many formerly colonized countries maintain
their hostility toward the doctrine for exactly this reason: it is tied to the
“historical baggage of rapacious exploitation and cynical hypocrisy” of
35
colonial powers.
Orientalist tropes seep into interventionist discourse when painting
36
Middle Eastern states as particularly and even cartoonishly despotic.
Former State Department legal adviser Harold Koh engaged in this framing,
dramatically declaring that it was Assad’s intent to kill a million Syrian
children overnight as an example of why unilateral humanitarian
37
intervention might be justified. The justification for the Libyan
intervention was grounded at once in the need to protect the United States’
regional Arab “allies and partners” from catastrophe in the form of refugee
flows, while noting that those same countries were on the brink of “the
darkest form of dictatorship, as repressive leaders concluded that violence is
38
the best strategy to cling to power.”
Neo-orientalist thought concludes that Middle Eastern states are
somehow particularly prone to despotism and in need of humanitarian
39
intervention. These conclusions are tinged with the paternalistic idea that
40
conflict in these countries cannot be solved absent intervention. They also
reflect a sense of entitlement to foreign intervention in the region. This right
41
is not grounded in law.
Unilateral humanitarian intervention is also classically colonialist in its
violation of sovereignty and self-determination. The UN Charter’s article 51
permits only three exceptions to the otherwise-blanket prohibition on interstate uses of force: self-defense, invitation by a host government, and

33.
Madhavi, supra note 20, at 11 (quoting RAMESH THAKUR, THE UNITED NATIONS,
PEACE AND SECURITY: FROM COLLECTIVE SECURITY TO THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
267 (2006)).
34.
Madhavi, supra note 20, at 9, 25, 27.
35.
RAMESH THAKUR, REVIEWING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: ORIGINS,
IMPLEMENTATION AND CONTROVERSIES 19 (Alex J. Bellamy et al. eds., 2019).
36.
Mahdavi, supra note 20, at 9.
37.
Harold Hongju Koh, The War Powers and Humanitarian Intervention, 53 HOUS.
L. REV. 971, 1005 (2016).
38.
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on
Libya (Mar. 28, 2011).
39.
Mahdavi, supra note 20, at 9; Mohammad Samiei, Neo-Orientalism? The
Relationship Between the West and Islam in Our Globalised World, 31 THIRD WORLD Q.
1145, 1148 (2010).
40.
Mahdavi, supra note 20, at 25.
41.
U.N. Charter arts. 2(4), 51.
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42

Security Council authorization. Inter-state uses of force that do not fall
into one of article 51’s exceptions are unjustified violations of state
sovereignty. Colonial powers essentially did not recognize the sovereignty
of colonized nations, interventionists frame states as losing their right to
43
sovereignty. Further, unilateral humanitarian intervention also “wrest[s]
44
self-determination from the national community,” not just the state. It
fundamentally undermines even the groups that it aims to benefit, doubting
45
the agency of local and regional actors to make their own history.
Finally, the intervenors’ reactions to their failure also reflect colonial
thought processes. Interventionists point in particular to the Rwandan
genocide as evidence of the horrors that can occur absent unilateral
46
humanitarian intervention. Yet recent unilateral humanitarian interventions
have hurt their intended beneficiaries and neighbors more than they have
helped. Libya and Syria have been in states of protracted civil war for over
47
ten years, exacerbated and prolonged by external intervention. Entire
generations have grown up in conflict. In Libya particularly, “there is no
functioning state to speak of,” and the Maghreb has become more
48
dangerous.
In observing these failed interventions, interventionists never doubt that
49
“outsiders [can] remake societies wholesale.” They have a “tendency to
50
rationalize, rather than reassess basic assumptions” – not just the
assumptions about their theory of intervention as a noble goal, but also their
assumptions about the ease with which outsiders can assess complex,
protracted national conflicts. States that are subject to intervention are but
case studies in the interventionist project. Interventionists “move on to the

42.
UN Charter art. 51.
43.
See Carrie Booth Walling, Human Rights Norms, State Sovereignty, and
Humanitarian Intervention, 37 HUM. RTS. Q. 383, 387 (2015); Jens David Ohlin, Two Visions
of the UN Charter, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 13, 2017), https://opiniojuris.org/2017/04/13/twovisions-of-the-un-charter/ (“Protecting the sovereignty of each state has instrumental value
because it allows states to flourish. But if sovereignty is simply preserving injustice, we need
to consider that there are other values at stake, other values that are prompted by international
law.”).
44.
RAJAN MENON, THE CONCEIT OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 49 (2016).
45.
See Migda Shihade, On the Difficulty in Predicting and Understanding the Arab
Spring: Orientalism, Euro-centrism, and Modernity, 17(2) INT’L J. PEACE STUD. 57, 59
(2012).
46.
See, e.g., Samantha Power, Bystanders to Genocide, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, SEPT.
2001.
47.
Alan J. Kuperman, Obama’s Libya Debacle, FOREIGN AFFS. (March/April 2015),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/libya/2019-02-18/obamas-libya-debacle (“All told, the
intervention extended Libya’s civil war from less than six weeks to more than eight
months.”).
48.
MENON, supra note 44, at 14.
49.
Id. at 31.
50.
Id.
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51

next experiment,” assured that prior failure was due to the problems of
policymaking or implementation.
It is worth pointing out that the debate about unilateral humanitarian
intervention’s legality also reflects imperial power imbalances. Only one
country’s legal position is that unilateral humanitarian intervention is an
acceptable justification for using force outside of the Charter: the United
Kingdom. The United States, Denmark, and other NATO allies advance
related positions or occasionally engage in unilateral humanitarian
52
intervention. In total, approximately thirty states position themselves as
pro-UHI.
On the anti-interventionist side, nearly 150 countries consistently and
53
vehemently oppose UHI. That latter group includes most post-colonial
states, who have explicitly argued that unilateral humanitarian intervention
54
is a mere reframing of colonialism. Their perspectives on the practice
should be prioritized; they are the states most well-positioned to understand
what colonial imposition looks and feels like, having experienced it
themselves. That UHI is framed in terms of universal human rights,
morality, and law is no shield to these criticisms. Colonialism was often
55
similarly framed in terms of benevolence.
The debate in law and scholarship surrounding UHI prioritizes the
voices of a small group of powerful states, presenting them as equal to a
much larger coalition that distinctly rejects the practice. Implicit is the
devaluation of the legal positions of developing and post-colonial countries.
The debate itself thus reflects imperial preferences.
One response to the above arguments might be that unilateral
humanitarian intervention is not a colonial continuation because it is not
based on overtly racist superiority constructs or resource theft. While the
56
literature is replete with examples to the contrary, for purposes of this
note, I take interventionists at their word that their primary concern is
human rights in target countries. Nonetheless, the fact that their concern is
tinged with the familiar colonial rhetoric of saving and civilizing remains
57
problematic.

51.
Id.
52.
Henriksen & Schack, supra note 2, at 126.
53.
Heller, supra note 5.
54.
Id.; Declaration Adopted on the Occasion of the Twenty-third Annual Ministerial
Meeting of the Group of 77, G-77 (Nov. 24, 1999), https://www.g77.org/doc/Decl1999.html
55.
INGIYIMBERE, supra note 9, at 22 (discussing the emergence of a moral
justification for imperialism that framed the practice as benevolent).
56.
See, e.g., Sedef Arat-Koç, Dance of Orientalisms and Waves of Catastrophes:
Culturalism and Pragmatism in Imperial Approaches to Islam and the Middle East, 35 THIRD
WORLD Q. 1656 (2014); see also Nguirane Cheikh, Stories Behind the Western-Led
Humanitarian Intervention in Libya: A Critical Analysis, 7 AFR. J. POL. SCI. & INT’L REL.
154 (2013); Mahdavi, supra note 20.
57.
INGIYIMBERE, supra note 9, at 39, 92, 104–114.
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If interventionists want to demonstrate their concern for and
commitment to human rights by engaging in unilateral humanitarian
interventions, they should be able to demonstrate that such a practice
actually meets their stated humanitarian goal. They cannot. Their
persistence and continued confidence that UHI can help control the outcome
of conflict and implement human rights is the ultimate “expression of
58
imperial arrogance” in the face of failure. The ease with which they move
on from their failures, while target states and regions must handle the
fallout, reflects colonial disregard for the immediate harm and long-term
consequences of their actions.
It is not necessarily the case that all humanitarian intervention reflects
solely colonial impulses or are repugnant to the purposes of customary
international law, either. There are real harms to human life, security, and
59
dignity that interventionists seek to prevent via unilateral action. Rather, it
is that the decision to intervene cannot be left to individual states acting
unilaterally. Within the current legal framework, the decision whether to
intervene lawfully with military force appropriately rests with the Security
Council and such decisive power should not be expanded via customary
60
international law. This is particularly the case when such expansion would
legitimize colonial thought processes regarding unilateral humanitarian
intervention and re-incorporate them into the international legal system.
Unilateral humanitarian intervention may appear new, but it is merely a
re-articulation of old colonial traditions that the international community
has rejected. Interventionists seek to incorporate unilateral humanitarian
intervention into the body of customary international law, but a practice that
repeats outdated and since-rejected norms is incompatible with that body.
Customary international law represents the capacity of the international
legal system to evolve and progress by incorporating new norms into the
law. Practices that repackage colonial constructs are the antithesis of
evolutive and progressive. They are instead distinctly regressive.

58.
Arat-Koç, supra note 56, at 1662.
59.
See, e.g., Moravcová, supra note 1 (introducing her article by reciting the many
crises occurring contemporaneously to her piece: “The on-going civil war in Syria, the
escalating armed conflicts in Iraq and the Gaza Strip, the extensive use of force by the security
forces in Sudan, and the systematic attacks on civilians in the Central African Republic, the
Democratic Republic of Congo and other places reflect the continuous presence of large-scale
violence in contemporary world affairs.”).
60.
There are many arguments put forward by states and scholars that call for the
Security Council to be expanded or otherwise reformed to better reflect the post-colonial era.
These arguments are not taken up here. I argue that intervention decisions are better left in the
hands of a collective rather than with individual states, particularly when those seeking to
intervene and circumvent the collective are usually members of the deciding collective
themselves (e.g. U.S., U.K.).
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III. The Legal Status of Unilateral Humanitarian
Intervention
A. Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention in the Text of the Charter
The primary goal of the United Nations is the maintenance of
61
“international peace and security.” The prevention of global conflict is an
62
essential measure of this goal’s achievement. As such, analysis of
63
unilateral humanitarian intervention should begin with the U.N. Charter.
One of the central means by which the Charter aims to maintain peace
64
and security is the general prohibition of the use of force across borders.
Article 51 provides only three exceptions to this prohibition: self-defense,
65
invitation by a host government, and Security Council authorization. There
is no textual basis in the Charter for treating humanitarian intervention any
66
differently than other justifications for the use of force. Humanitarian
intervention is only explicitly authorized under the Charter if it falls within
67
one of article 51’s exceptions.
This conclusion causes many to bristle. That the Charter system’s rigid
prohibition on the use of force might allow a state to engage in genocide
because of a Security Council veto, for instance, is morally and politically
68
unacceptable for advocates of humanitarian intervention.
Observing this rigidity, some have argued against such a literal, fourcorners approach to interpreting the Charter. More expansive interpretations
emphasize that maintenance of international peace and security is central to
the Charter system and argue that this goal should be prioritized when
articles 2(4) and 51’s constraints on the use of force would result in
69
humanitarian crises going unchecked. In Legality of Use of Force, for
instance, Belgium defended their intervention in Yugoslavia by arguing that
article 2(4)’s prohibition on the use of force covers only “intervention
against the territorial integrity or political independence of a State,” and
armed humanitarian intervention that questions neither the political
independence nor territorial integrity of the target state is not a violation of

61.
U.N. Charter art. 1(1).
62.
Id.
63.
Use of Force, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/useforce (last visited Oct. 18, 2021) (“General public international law and the law of the United
Nations Charter govern the legality of the resort to the use of force between States.”).
64.
U.N. Charter art. 2(4).
65.
U.N. Charter arts. 2(4), 51.
66.
See Henriksen & Schack, supra note 2, at 146.
67.
U.N. Charter arts. 2(4), 51.
68.
Stephen J. Stedman, The New Interventionists, FOREIGN AFFS., 1992/1993, at 1, 2.
69.
See, e.g., HEDLEY BULL, INTERVENTION IN WORLD POLITICS 193 (1984)
(suggesting that if Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention (“UHI”) expresses the “collective
will” of states, it may not necessarily pose a threat to international order).

Michigan Journal of International Law

252

[Vol. 43:241

70

the Charter. Ultimately, Belgium stood alone – the twenty-six other NATO
states involved in the intervention Belgium was defending did not invoke
71
UHI as the basis for their action.
A prominent commentator who pushes against the textual interpretation
is Harold Koh, former State Department legal adviser. Koh opposes the
72
“conventional” textual perspective on international law. Instead, Koh
agrees with British Legal Adviser Sir Daniel Bethlehem that an analysis of
humanitarian intervention relying on the prohibitions of article 2(4), as well
as the related concepts of non-intervention and sovereignty, is “overly
73
simplistic.” But these arguments describe the world of law outside the
purely textual realm, drawing on theories of customary international law
and law-making, addressed infra.
Critics of the textual position are not entirely wrong; there is a tension
between maintaining international peace and security and allowing intrastate crises to go unaddressed in the face of Security Council inaction. In
terms of treaty language, however, the Charter itself recognizes this tension.
The general prohibition on the use of force contained in article 2(4) and the
exceptions in article 51 implicitly recognize that there will be intra-state
crises that are not addressed via inter-state military action. Article 24 states
that U.N. member states confer to the Security Council the “primary
74
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.”
The U.N. system for regulating the use of interstate force absent a selfdefense or invitation justification is thus clear-cut: in the interest of
maintaining international peace and security, states must seek Security
Council authorization.
Many critics argue that consistent use of a veto by a Security Council
member in the face of a humanitarian crisis reflects dysfunction in the
75
Charter system. These critics do not complain of a complete Security
76
Council deadlock, such as that which characterized the Cold War, but
instead argue that issue-specific persistent vetoes are reflective of such
dysfunction when the issue in question is a particular humanitarian crisis,

70.
Legality of Use of Force (Serb. & Montenegro v Belg.), Verbatim Record, 34
(May 10, 1999), https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/108/108-19990510-ORA-0100-BI.pdf.
71.
Heller, supra note 5.
72.
Koh, supra note 37, at 1004 (discussing his own views and those of U.K. Legal
Advisor Sir Daniel Bethlehem).
73.
Id. at 1005.
74.
U.N. Charter art. 24(7).
75.
Koh, supra note 37, at 1005.
76.
See Philippa Webb, Deadlock or Restraint? The Security Council Veto and the Use
of Force in Syria, 19 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 471, 474 (2014).
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77

such as in Syria. In these situations, interventionists argue, the Security
Council is acting contrary to their mandate of maintaining international
78
peace and security.
However, to extrapolate that a persistent veto is indicative of systemic
dysfunction is to ignore the other important tools at the United Nations’ and
Member States’ disposal that can influence how humanitarian crises unfold.
The United Nations has many organs devoted to human rights; the Security
Council regularly adopts resolutions related to human rights; the General
Assembly similarly routinely passes resolutions and statements on human
rights and humanitarian crises. These tools are not always ineffective,
either. Indeed, the United Nations’ diplomatic and advocacy-based efforts in
reaction to South Africa’s apartheid are emblematic of the international
community’s ability to influence humanitarian crises without unilateral
79
intervention. These institutional practices do not reflect systemic
80
dysfunction with respect to issues of humanitarian concern.
Persistent veto usage is not an indication of systemic dysfunction. The
Charter system was explicitly designed to discourage the international use
81
of force and thus makes it difficult to do so legally. Persistent vetoes, even
in situations of humanitarian crisis, could, in fact, further the project of
international peace and security by confining a crisis to its state of origin.
Security Council vetoes are not symptomatic of dysfunction nor are they
inherently contrary to the purpose of the enterprise as contained in articles 1
82
83
and 24. Rather, it is the system functioning as planned.
Despite these critiques, the simple fact remains that the text of the U.N.
Charter does not authorize unilateral humanitarian intervention. The Charter
contains a blanket prohibition on international uses of force in article 2(4)

77.
See e.g., Trahan, supra note 5 (“[T]here are times that UN Security Council
dysfunctionality in voting serves to shield the commission of atrocity crimes . . . Russia has
been shielding the Assad regime.”).
78.
See id. (explaining that states can seek an ICJ opinion as to whether some vetoes
may be “null and void” when read in the context of the U.N. Charter as a whole, implying, in
part, that the obligation to maintain international peace and security may nullify the validity of
a veto.).
79.
Other United Nations Bodies, U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. HIGH COMM’R,
https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/pages/otherunitednationsbodies.aspx
(listing 23 other United Nations agencies and offices as either explicitly devoted to human
rights issues or regularly engaging with them); Resolutions Adopted by the Security Council in
2021, U.N. SEC. COUNCIL, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adoptedsecurity-council-2021 (detailing how twenty-one of the twenty-eight resolutions adopted by
the Security Council in 2021 engaged with human rights concerns to some degree).
80.
Enuga S. Reddy, The Struggle Against Apartheid: Lessons for Today’s World,
U.N. CHRON., https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/struggle-against-apartheid-lessons-todaysworld.
81.
See id. arts. 1, 2, 51.
82.
Id. arts. 1, 24.
83.
U.N. Charter art. 27.
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and provides for specific exceptions in article 51. Criticisms of the text and
system’s rigidity notwithstanding, the legality of unilateral humanitarian
intervention is not based on the U.N. Charter.

B. Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention in
Customary International Law
As the lawfulness of unilateral humanitarian interventions is not
contained in the text of the U.N. Charter, we must turn instead to customary
international law. Traditionally, customary international law has been
84
understood as “unwritten law deriving from practice accepted as law.” Put
differently, customary international law is derived from general and
consistent state practices and acquiescence to said practices as legal (opinio
85
juris). Customary international law is an important source of public
international law that operates concurrently to treaty law, particularly for the
86
law on the use of force. Interventionists seek to fill the textual gap by
finding that customary international law licenses unilateral humanitarian
87
intervention. That is, customary international law could create a new
88
exception to the Charter’s prohibition on the use of force.

C. State Practice
An action or norm that would amount to customary international law
must be practiced generally and consistently, as well as extensively and
89
representatively. It is not necessary that all states engage in the practice,
but those that do should represent a variety of the “interests at stake and/or
90
the various geographical regions.”
Humanitarian intervention has not become a general practice. States do
not regularly intervene in humanitarian crises. In fact, humanitarian
intervention has often been “more noteworthy in its breach” than in its
91
practice. There are several contemporary humanitarian crises – including
some of the most striking acts of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing,
84.
U.N. Int’l L. Comm’n, Rep. of the International Law Commission on the Work of
the Seventieth Session, U.N. Doc. A/73/10, at 122 (2018).
85.
Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary
International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INTL. L. 757, 758 (2001).
86.
Monica Hakimi, Making Sense of Customary International Law, 118 MICH. L.
REV. 1487, 1487 (2020).
87.
E.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Syria and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention
(Part II: International Law and the Way Forward, EJIL:TALK! (Oct. 4, 2013)
https://www.ejiltalk.org/syria-and-the-law-of-humanitarian-intervention-part-ii-internationallaw-and-the-way-forward/.
88.
Id.
89.
See U.N. Int’l L. Comm’n, supra note 84, at 135.
90.
Id. at 136.
91.
MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT & RICHARD S. WILLIAMSON, THE UNITED STATES AND
R2P: FROM WORDS TO ACTION 7 (Brookings Inst. 2006).
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and crimes against humanity – in which states have not intervened with the
92
unilateral use of force. In addition, a geographically and interest-based
representative practice has not occurred. Rather, humanitarian interventions
93
have been sporadic and geographically limited.

D. Opinio Juris
To become customary international law, actions must not simply form a
practice but must also be done due to a sense of legality, opinio juris, on the
94
part of states. Outside of treaty law, “states’ expressions of the perceived
extent and content of their international legal obligations are key
95
constitutive elements” of customary international law.
Modern practice and opinio juris can also be derived from general
96
statements of rules rather than specific instances of practice. That is,
treaties, declarations, and statements made in international fora crystallize
custom by reflecting opinio juris, and the act of making those statements is
97
a practice in itself.
This is where UHI might find its footing in customary international law.
The United States, the United Kingdom, and Denmark have all adopted
legal positions indicating their belief that unilateral humanitarian
intervention may be compatible with international law absent Security
98
Council authorization. The United Kingdom has been the most vocal on

92.
See, e.g., Yukiko Nishikawa, Saving the Stateless? Myanmar, the Rohingya, and
R2P, OXFORD RSCH. GRP. (Mar. 21, 2019) (discussing the lack of intervention in Myanmar and
the problems of applying the “responsibility to protect” to the Rohingya genocide); R2P
MONITOR, GLOB. CTR. FOR RESP. TO PROTECT, (Sept. 15, 2020), https://www.globalr2p.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/10/R2P_Monitor_SEPT2020_Final.pdf, (discussing what the center
considers actionable crises. Of the eight countries identified as in need of urgent action, half have
not had any military intervention at all.).
93.
See Kevin Jon Heller, The Illegality of ‘Genuine’ Unilateral Humanitarian
Intervention, 32 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 26–27 (listing unilateral humanitarian interventions
between 1991–2003. Six of the nine interventions were American- and/or European-led; of
the American-/European-led interventions, four were in countries outside of the West); id. at
9-13 (listing only thirteen times UHI was wholly or in part a rationale for intervention, over
half of which were American- and/or European-led. The contemporary interventions in Syria
and Libya were also American- and European-led.).
94.
Customary International Law, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, https://
www.law.cornell.edu/wex/customary_international_law; see U.N. Int’l L. Comm’n, supra
note 84, at 119 (“To determine the existence and content of a rule of customary international
law, it is necessary to ascertain whether there is a general practice that is accepted as law
(opinio juris).”).
95.
Michael N. Schmitt & Sean Watts, State Opinio Juris and International
Humanitarian Law Pluralism, 91 INT’L. L. STUD. 171, 177 (2015).
96.
Roberts, supra note 85, at 758.
97.
Id.
98.
Henriksen & Schack, supra note 2, at 126.
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99

this point. In a 2013 legal memorandum, the U.K. stated its position that
“it is permitted under international law to take exceptional measures in
order to avert a humanitarian catastrophe,” referring to the possibility of
100
unilateral humanitarian intervention in Syria.
Yet despite the legal positions and related statements made by states
who advocate for the right to UHI, there is a strong contingent of states
101
whose position is that it is decidedly illegal. The G77, a coalition of 134
developing countries, has rejected “the so-called right to unilateral
humanitarian intervention” since 1999, citing a lack of basis in the
102
Charter. The Non-Aligned Movement, which numbers approximately half
of the Member States of the U.N., has “unequivocally condemned” the use
103
of force in unilateral humanitarian intervention. This broad coalition
104
includes major world powers—such as China, India, and South Africa.
Repeated declarations and statements from these groups also form part of
the practice and opinio juris of customary international law, indicating that
unilateral humanitarian intervention’s legality has not been established in
terms of state practice or opinio juris.
Individual states have also rejected the legal positions of the United
Kingdom and other states, suspecting that the efforts to legitimize UHI
105
camouflage more insidious goals. This sentiment is especially strong in
106
post-colonial, non-European states.
For example, the statements of
th
Bolivia’s delegate at the 7919 Meeting of the Security Council – a meeting
reactive to the unilateral action taken in Syria in 2017 – reflect such a
suspicion. The delegate described unilateral humanitarian intervention as
107
violating the Charter. He further quoted former U.N. Secretary-General
Ban Ki-moon’s statement that “everything should be handled within the
108
framework of the United Nations Charter.” The delegate characterized

99.
Ryan Goodman, UK Government Issues Major Statement on Legality of
Humanitarian Intervention, JUST SEC. (Jan. 30, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/6583/ukgovernment-issues-major-statement-legality-humanitarian-intervention/.
100.
Id.
101.
Heller, supra note 5.
102.
Declaration Adopted on the Occasion of the Twenty-third Annual Ministerial
Meeting of the Group of 77, G-77 (Nov. 24, 1999), https://www.g77.org/doc/Decl1999.html.
103.
Heller, supra note 5 (quoting the Non-Aligned Movement’s (“NAM”) legal
position and noting that there is membership overlap between the G77 and NAM).
104.
Id.
105.
See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 71st Sess., 7919th Mtg., UN Doc. S/PV.7919 (Apr. 7. 2017)
(with representatives of Bolivia, Russia, Syria criticizing the American UHI in Syria. This
posture was to be expected of the latter two countries, but all three explicitly or implicitly
identified competing motives for the intervention); see also Heller, supra note 93 (discussing
parallel motives).
106.
MENON, supra note 44, at 10.
107.
U.N. SCOR, supra note 105, at 3.
108.
Id. at 4.
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such unilateral interventions as “imperialistic” and “a serious threat to
109
international peace and security.”
In sum, established practice does not indicate that UHI meets the first
prong of customary international law. The actual practice is relatively
110
rare.
Diplomatic statements concerning unilateral humanitarian
intervention do not reflect a cohesive practice among states. Rather, a
minority of states advance their interventionist position while many more
strongly oppose it. The aforementioned diplomatic statements and state
declarations indicate the distinct lack of opinio juris on UHI’s legality. The
United Kingdom is still the only nation to clearly indicate that they believe
that unilateral humanitarian intervention has firm legal ground, while the
United States and Denmark seem to support the practice on an ad hoc
111
basis. Thus, unilateral humanitarian intervention meets neither the practice
nor opinio juris prongs of customary international law.
Finding that unilateral humanitarian intervention is legal under
customary international law would require weighing the practices and legal
opinion of a small handful of states against the vehement and vocal
disagreement of nearly 200 states. Such a conclusion is untenable under
modern customary international law.

E. “Law-Making Moment”
Despite the strong opposition, the legal status of unilateral humanitarian
intervention does appear to be shifting in the long- and short-term. The
governments that now most strongly support UHI’s legality initially
112
condemned it as illegal and destabilizing. Even the U.K.’s strong position
is relatively new in its history. In 1999, the House of Commons Foreign
Affairs Committee concluded that the doctrine of unilateral humanitarian
113
intervention had, at best, a “tenuous” basis in customary international law.
As recently as fifteen years ago, the leading opinion on unilateral
114
intervention was that it found “no support in international law.” However,
subsequent military and diplomatic actions have shaken up formerly firm
ground. States have undertaken actions resembling unilateral humanitarian
interventions without presenting them as such. The modern era has seen
humanitarian intervention come to be regarded in the West as both

109.
Id. at 3–4.
110.
See Heller, supra note 93, at 9–12 (listing thirteen interventions justified in whole
or part on UHI between 1971 and 2018).
111.
Henriksen & Schack, supra note 2, at 126.
112.
MENON, supra note 44, at 23 (discussing these governments’ legal and political
positions in the 1970s).
113.
Henriksen & Schack, supra note 2, at 140.
114.
Petr Valek, Is Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention Compatible with the U.N.
Charter?, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1223, 1228 (2005).
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“desirable and permissible, powered by a commitment to universal human
115
rights.”
It is thus not outside the realm of possibility that other states will
similarly change their opinions and practices in this area. While it cannot be
said that unilateral humanitarian intervention is now legal, we may be in a
116
“lawmaking moment” as state practice continues to shift.
Given that UHI’s legal status is in flux, we must shift our analysis. The
central question of UHI is not whether it is legal. The more important
question is whether it should be and, importantly, whether it even can be in
light of the normative foundations of customary international law.

IV. The Purposes of Customary International Law &
Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention
The importance of customary international law should not be
understated. It is a fundamental underpinning of international law’s
relevance that it adapts to new developments, moral stances, and
117
challenges. Customary international law is one of the primary means
118
through which international law evolves. Treaty negotiation can be
lengthy and difficult, but customary international law allows the
international community to address timely challenges and recognize new
119
practical developments.
Customary international law “fill[s] critical gaps in the international
120
legal system.” It “defines most of the content of international law; it is the
121
main mode of international regulation.” It has an especially important role
in developing specialized areas of law, expanding the rules of international
122
law beyond treaty ratification, and regulating state conduct. Customary

115.
MENON, supra note 44, at 23–24.
116.
Koh, supra note 37, at 1016.
117.
Bill Campbell, The Dynamic Evolution of International Law - The Case for the
More Purposeful Development of Customary International Law, 49 VICTORIA U.
WELLINGTON L. REV. 561, 561 (2018).
118.
U.N. Charter art. 38(1) (identifying Customary International Law (“CIL”) as one
of the three primary sources of public international law); John Dugard, The Application of
Customary International Law Affecting Human Rights by National Tribunals, 76 PROCS.
ANN. MEETING (AM. SOC. INT’L L.) 245, 245–251 (1982) (noting that while treaty-based law
is relatively static, customary international law evolves dynamically because it is derived from
practice).
119.
Campbell, supra note 117, at 561.
120.
B.S. Chimni, Customary International Law: A Third World Perspective, 112 AM.
J. INT’L L. 1, 8 (2018).
121.
Hakimi, supra note 86, at 1488.
122.
Chimni, supra note 120, at 8.
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international law’s purpose is thus evolutive and expansive. It reflects the
continued conceptual growth of the law as the international community
addresses new questions. When considering unilateral humanitarian
intervention’s legal status, we should consider whether integrating this
practice into the law would similarly advance evolutive legal goals.
Proponents of unilateral humanitarian intervention argue that it would.
The humanitarian interventionist’s ideology is rooted in a progressing view
124
of history similar to customary international law’s view of the law. Moral
and ethical norms can advance with the law, if not advance the law itself,
and interventionists thus conclude that UHI matches well with the purpose
125
of customary international law.
These understandings rest on the
assumption that UHI is a new kind of practice, morally distinct from former
intervening practices.
Most countries would agree that new international law should not allow
126
for a re-colonial cycle. The United Nations has declared each of the last
four decades to be International Decades for the Eradication of Colonialism
127
(1990-2030).
It has passed numerous resolutions on the topic of
decolonization and the right to self-determination, affirming the “right of
peoples under colonial rule to exercise their right to self-determination and
the right of every nation . . . to choose freely and without any external
128
influence its political, social, and economic system.” Decolonial thought,
at least on paper, has carried the day.
Neo-colonialism, however, has followed in colonialism’s footsteps
despite decolonial efforts. It is characterized by the continuing exploitation
129
of newly independent countries in the post-colonial period. Distinct from
123.
U.N. Charter art. 38(1) (identifying CIL as one of the three sources of international
law, complementing treaty law and court decisions); U.N. Int’l L. Comm’n, supra note 84, at
119 (noting the development of CIL over time).
124.
MENON, supra note 44, at 23.
125.
See, e.g., Jens David Ohlin, Two Visions of the UN Charter, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 4,
2017), https://opiniojuris.org/2017/04/13/two-visions-of-the-un-charter/ (arguing that the
changed nature of most armed conflict since the establishment of the Charter, our vision of the
Charter must change, either by emphasizing different provisions or integrating CIL); see also
Harold Koh, Not Illegal: But Now The Hard Part Begins, JUST SEC. (Apr. 7, 2017),
https://www.justsecurity.org/39695/illegal-hard-part-begins/ (suggesting a new test for
judging the lawfulness of UHI).
126.
The original Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples was supported by all eighty-nine voting member states, with nine abstentions.
G.A. Res. 1514 (XV) (Dec. 14, 1960). The most recent resolution naming the Fourth
International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism was supported by 148 voting member
states, with three votes against and twenty-three abstentions. G.A. Res. 75/123 (Dec. 10,
2020).
127.
U.N. Documentation: Decolonization, Key Documents Related to Decolonization,
U.N. DAG HAMMARSKÖLD LIBRARY, https://research.un.org/en/docs/decolonization/keydocs
(last visited Oct. 18, 2020).
128.
G.A. Res. 2160 (XXI), at 1 (Nov. 30, 1966).
129.
Chimni, supra note 29, at 27.

260

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 43:241

the overt physical and economic exploitation and domination that defined
the colonial period, neo-colonial and imperialist practices frame hegemony
130
in terms of universal moral truths and “global values.”
While the international community has in theory rejected colonialism,
neo-colonial practices and theories of law do not necessarily conflict with
customary international law or treaty law. There is nothing in the law that
prohibits neo-colonialism: practices that reinforce power imbalances may
131
proliferate so long as they do not violate an existing rule. Normatively,
however, customary international law cannot align with neo-colonial or
imperial practices because they are antithetical to the evolutionary and
progressive purpose of customary international law.
The idea that certain practices are inapposite to customary international
law – and thus cannot be incorporated into it – is not novel. For example,
states’ continued violations of human rights are not understood as
contributing to a practice that could result in a new rule of customary
132
international law unraveling human rights treaty law. Human rights
violations are only understood to violate existing treaty and customary
international law, not as contributing to the general practice prong of
133
customary international law. We should approach neo-colonial practices
in much the same way – as inherently incompatible with the evolutive goals
of customary international law and the international community’s goal of
decolonization.
For this reason, unilateral humanitarian intervention should not be
incorporated into customary international law. The reactions to unilateral
humanitarian intervention from developing states and TWAIL scholarship
should be centered and prioritized. These scholars and states view UHI as a
134
continuation of colonialism’s power imbalances. As a practice rooted in
colonial tradition and thought processes, unilateral humanitarian
intervention is incompatible with customary international law’s emphasis on
progression.

130.
Id. at 31.
131.
That is, the terms “neo-colonial” and “imperialist” are characterized by continuing
exploitation in the postcolonial period, described by TWAIL scholars as part-and-parcel of the
international legal and economic order. While some practices that are neo-colonial/imperialist
might be found illegal because of the practice violating an existing rule, simply being neocolonial or imperialist in nature is not illegal. Not only can these practices run rampant,
TWAIL scholars argue that they do. Id.
132.
Jan Wouters & Cedric Ryngaert, Impact on the Process of the Formation of
Customary International Law, in THE IMPACT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW ON GENERAL
INTERNATIONAL Law 111 (Menno T. Kamminga ed., 2009).
133.
Id.
134.
See Part II, supra.
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V. Conclusion
The legal justifications for unilateral humanitarian intervention attempt
to circumvent established treaty law by building a pathway to intervention
via customary international law. This has not been universally accepted, but
it is concerning to see it proliferate in the language of diplomats and
humanitarian advocates.
Much of the discourse around humanitarian intervention reflects
familiar colonialist, imperialist, and Orientalist sentiments. Interventionists
simplify individual international conflicts and then re-simplify them in
groups that they claim are conceptually linked, framing these conflicts only
in terms of what is relevant to outside intervenors. They further rely on
Orientalist tropes of governments and leaders as cartoonishly cruel. In the
face of failure, interventionists do not question their goals, only the means
with which intervention was implemented in a target state. The target states
are left to deal with the consequences of said failed interventions.
Interventionists move on to their next “case study” without reflecting on
whether the overarching project is worth pursuing. The debate itself requires
the elevation of powerful states’ opinions, weighing them equally or even
greater than a much larger group of states that reject the practice as patently
illegal. All of this reflects colonialist and imperialist tradition.
Practices that so reflect the rejected institutions of the past conflict with
the purposes of customary international law – to grow and progress, to
encourage the proliferation of law in new areas. Unilateral humanitarian
intervention is rejected by post-colonial states and TWAIL scholars for a
reason: it is a repackaging of colonial thought and practice. Colonial
imposition is not a new practice. As such, unilateral humanitarian
intervention should be understood as antithetical to customary international
law’s central purpose and be rejected as incompatible with the development
of the law.

